



Multiculturalism is a problem today and for the foreseeable future 
– a problem for politics and the ethics of politics. In this essay I want 
to explore the implications of the liberal political philosophy. I have 
faith in for the way contemporary democracies should deal with this 
problem.
Political philosophy does not provide us with eternally valid theo-
ries for the government of all human societies. To my mind political 
philosophy is time-bound. It is valid – if it is valid at all – for the 
conditions prevailing here and now. Its conclusions, apply also to 
similar situations elsewhere. But we cannot set the precise bounda-
ries for their application. There are two reasons for this limitation.
First, it is impossible to articulate comprehensively all the relevant 
moral considerations we are aware of, and impossible to state in gen-
eral how much they weigh against each other in situations of confl ict. 
Moral knowledge is practical in a special sense: it is embodied in our 
practices and acquired by habituation. We often know what to do 
when faced with the situation in which action is called for, when we 
could not have known what to do ahead of time. Everything we know 
can be articulated, can be expressed in words. But it cannot be ex-
haustively expressed in general abstract formulae. The situation is 
*  This article is adapted from a talk given at a conference on Multiculturalism and the Law 
organized by Max Brod in Leiden in July 1992. More detailed arguments for the views sketched 
here can be found in the following works by the author: The Morality of Freedom, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 1986; J. Raz-A. Margalit National Self-Determination, «The Journal of 
Philosophy», 87, 1990, pp. 439-61; and J. Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identifi cation, «Ox-
ford Journal of Legal Studies», 11, 1991, p. 303. The author wishes to thank P. A. Bulloch for 
helpful comments on an earlier version.
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analogous with that of a person who embarks on a journey to a dis-
tant destination. Ask him ahead of time to describe the route and he 
will be unable to do so. Yet as he progresses along the road, he
recalls at every stage how to proceed at that point. Not everything we 
know can we exhaustively state in the abstract. Moral knowledge 
escapes such formulation, and that means that moral theories are to 
be taken as mere approximations. Those who apply them infl exibly 
are fanatics heading for disaster.
The second reason for the fact that political morality is bound to 
the here and now is that there are limitations to our ability to con-
ceive how society will develop. The problem is not merely due to the 
complexity of the social conditions that may prevail in the future, a 
complexity that defeats our ability to apply our principles to those 
conditions. The problem extends further. Social situations can change 
in such a way that the concepts we employ to understand them be-
come inapplicable.
I start my refl ections with these remarks for two reasons. First, my 
belief in the contextuality of political theory presupposes value plu-
ralism, which lies at the heart of the problem of multiculturalism. 
Second, contextuality highlights the complicated relations of contem-
porary liberalism to its classical ancestry. That relationship is not one 
of identity. Seventeenth and Eighteenth-century liberalism was, by 
and large, right for its time and place. Those of us who adhere today 
to liberalism should do so not by following the theories of Locke or 
Kant, but by looking for contemporary theories, valid for our own 
conditions, which descend in spirit from the classical texts. This is 
important for a refl ection on the importance of community for indi-
vidual wellbeing.
The migration of labor familiar since the rise of capitalism, and 
accelerated to undreamt of proportions by the combined effect of 
contemporary mass media, rapid communication, and easy transpor-
tation, has led to unprecedented levels of communal disintegration 
and individual alienation. The Nineteenth – century bourgeoisie
reacted to the migrations from the country to the cities by developing 
a rich urban culture, a culture of anonymity and bureaucratic impar-
tiality. This is the culture we are all children of, a culture in which 
people resent charity and insist on entitlements to social services and 
benefi ts fi nanced by strangers whom they never meet, and admini-
stered by faceless offi cials. Ours is a culture in which we feel more 
comfortable on a beach, in a park, a restaurant, or in a concert hall 
bustling with strangers, observing them as they observe us, than on a 
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lonely beach or an empty restaurant. We feel at ease in an apartment 
building served by elevators that keep its residents unseen by each 
other, and we feel stifl ed in a closely knit local community where 
everyone knows us, and where every deviation from our daily routine 
and every one of our visitors is closely observed by our neighbors.
The advantages of the culture of urban anonymity are many. But 
such anonymity is inadequate to cope with the multiculturalism that 
fi rst emerged in many countries as a by-product of the decolonization 
movement and is gathering pace all the time. The culture of urban 
anonymity could absorb individual migrants escaping oppressive or 
disintegrating societies. It is tempting to exaggerate and say that it 
was made for such people. But this culture cannot adequately cope 
with the conditions of today. The threatening results of this failure 
are subcultures of anomie, alienation from society and its institutions, 
and the emergence of a growing underclass.
Liberalism has responded to the phenomenon of diversity in three 
ways. First was the attitude that I will call “toleration”1. It consists in 
letting minorities conduct themselves as they wish without being 
criminalized, so long as they do not interfere with the culture of the 
majority. To a considerable degree this meant restriction of the use of 
public spaces and public media by the minority. It also usually meant 
that all its activities were to be fi nanced out of the resources of the 
minority community – in addition to its contribution through taxation 
to the maintenance of the general culture.
Two types of argument are commonly advanced to support tolera-
tion. First, principled reasons for restricting the use of coercion: the 
Harm Principle, for example, prescribes that people may not be
coerced except in order to restrain them from causing harm to others 
or to punish them for causing harm to others. Arguments of the sec-
ond type, appeal to considerations of public peace, social harmony, 
and the legitimation of the system of government, all of which may 
be jeopardized by the resentment of minorities that are not allowed to 
continue with their religious and cultural activities.
Toleration was eventually supplemented, perhaps even supplanted, 
by a second liberal policy toward minorities-one based on the
assertion of an individual right against discrimination on national, 
racial, ethnic, or religious grounds, or on grounds of gender or sex-
ual orientation. Nondiscrimination rights are a natural extension of 
1  I do not mean to suggest that the concept of toleration cannot be applied to other policies. I 
have offered a more comprehensive analysis of toleration in The Morality of Freedom, cit. Here I 
use the term to capture the spirit of one fairly familiar attitude toward minorities.
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the classical liberal conception of constitutional civil and political 
rights. They also fi t that strand of liberalism made popular by the 
writings of John Rawls, according to which the principles used to 
justify political action should make no reference to any specifi c con-
ception of the good life.
Nondiscrimination rights go well beyond toleration. They have 
far-reaching consequences that affect the way the majority commu-
nity leads its own life. Most obviously, it is no longer free to exclude 
members of the minority from its schools, places of employment, 
residential neighborhoods, and so on. Usually nondiscrimination 
rights are interpreted to allow each community control over certain 
institutions. They also normally tolerate a measure of discrimination 
in oneʼs private dealings. But under a regime of scrupulous nondis-
crimination a countryʼs public services, its educational system, and 
its economic and political arenas are no longer the preserve of the 
majority, but common to all its members as individuals.
The third liberal approach to the problem of minorities is the
affi rmation of multiculturalism. It is advanced as suitable in those soci-
eties in which there are several stable cultural communities both 
wishing and able to perpetuate themselves. It does not apply to coun-
tries that receive many immigrants from diverse cultures, but where 
those from each culture are few in number or, even if numerous, do 
not wish to keep their separate identity. Perhaps even their very mi-
gration to the host country is an expression of their rejection of the 
culture or group from which they emigrated. Finally, multicultural-
ism should not be-pursued regarding cultural groups that have lost 
their ability to perpetuate themselves. This could happen where the 
ossifi cation of their culture and the allure of the surrounding cultures 
mean that the vast majority of their young people wish to assimilate 
into the majority culture.
In the rest of this essay, I will use “multiculturalism” to refer to 
a society in which the conditions set out in the previous paragraph 
obtain, and also to a policy of saying yes to this situation. It is 
important to distinguish two types of multicultural societies. In 
one, the different communities live mainly in separate geographi-
cal regions (for example, the Inuits in Canada and the Scots in 
Britain). In the other, there is in the main no geographical sepa-
rateness. For the most part the different communities share the 
same public places and common services, and they mix in work-
places and in leisure facilities. It is this second condition that 
characterizes societies whose multiculturalism is relatively recent, 
Joseph Raz 33
resulting from the ever-growing migrations of the modern era. 
This essay focuses on the second type, that of multiculturalism 
without territorial separation.
The policy of multiculturalism differs from that which relies ex-
clusively on nondiscrimination rights in rejecting the individualistic 
bias of the latter. While endorsing nondiscrimination rights, multicul-
turalism emphasizes the importance to political action of two evalua-
tive judgments. First, the belief that individual freedom and prosper-
ity depend on full and unimpeded membership in a respected and 
fl ourishing cultural group. Second, a belief in value pluralism, and in 
particular in the validity of the diverse values embodied in the prac-
tices of different societies.
Given those beliefs, multiculturalism requires a political society to 
recognize the equal standing of all the stable and viable cultural com-
munities existing in that society. This implies the need for multicul-
tural political societies to reconceive themselves. There is no room 
for talk of a minority problem or of a majority tolerating the minori-
ties. A political society, a state, consists – if it is multicultural – of 
diverse communities and belongs to none of them. Although the rela-
tive size of the different communities affects the solutions to confl icts 
over resources and public spaces among them, none of them should 
be allowed to see the state as its own, or to think that the others enjoy 
their standing on sufferance.
The purpose of my remaining discussion is to elaborate and de-
fend this brief description of multiculturalism. I will do so from a 
liberal perspective. Not everyone in the liberal camp – if I may call 
it that – will agree to these views. Liberal doubts about multicultural-
ism stem from three main sources: fi rst, there is the view of liberal-
ism as the bastion of individual, freedom, and correspondingly a fear 
that multiculturalism supports the power of communities to hold on 
to reluctant members against their will. Second, there is the view of 
the superiority of the secular, democratic, European culture, and a 
reluctance to admit equal rights to inferior oppressive religious cul-
tures, or ones whose cultural values are seen as limited and less
developed. Why should liberals give succor to cultures based on the 
repudiation of liberal values? Finally, there is the fear that a common 
culture is the cement of society and that without it society will fall 
apart. I will fi rst state briefl y the liberal case for multiculturalism and 
then deal with these three objections.
The brief argument is that denial of multiculturalism in todayʼs 
Western societies, far from keeping liberal ideals pure, leads to their 
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degeneration into what might be called “supermarket liberalism”. Be-
fore I venture a brief explanation, I would like to clarify the spirit 
underlying my observations. It is not one of utopian hope. It is not 
one of a vision of the great future liberalism holds the key to, a future 
in which the noblest human hopes will come to fruition. It is the 
spirit of pessimism nourished by perception of confl ict as inevitable, 
and its resolution as less than ideal, regardless of who wins.
1. The Case for Multiculturalism
Liberalism is a political morality that arises out of a view of the 
good of people, a view that emphasizes the value of freedom to indi-
vidual well-being. Liberalism upholds the value of being in charge of 
oneʼs life, charting its course by oneʼs own successive choices. Much 
liberal thought has explored the ways in which restrictions on indi-
vidual choices, whether legal or social, can be removed and obstacles 
to choice – due to poverty, lack of education, or other limitations on 
access to goods – overcome. It was also common once, though not 
now, to distinguish freedom and license. Freedom, said Spinoza, 
Kant, and others, is conduct in accord with rational laws. License is 
arbitrary choice, in disregard of reason. The slogan that freedom is 
not license was often abused, and abused to impose unreasonable 
restrictions on freedom. I believe, however, that when correctly un-
derstood, this view is right. Moreover, once it is reinstated and its 
implications understood, the justifi cation of multiculturalism becomes 
obvious.
The claim that freedom is action in accordance with reason is a 
consequence of the fact that freedom presupposes the availability of 
options to choose from, and that options – all except the very elemen-
tary ones – have an internal structure, an inner logic with witch we 
must comply in order to exercise our freedom. A simple illustration 
will make the point. One cannot play chess by doing what one wants, 
that is, by moving the rook diagonally. One can only play chess by 
following the rules of chess. Having to do so may look like a limita-
tion of freedom to a child. But that is the tempting illusion of license. 
In fact, complying with the rules of chess and of other options is a 
precondition of freedom, an inescapable part of its realization.
Of course, games are unlike the practice of medicine or law, the 
profession of teaching, or the role of parents, spouses, friends, and so 
on. Relative to the options that make up the core of our lives they are 
simple and tend to be governed by explicit rules. The options that 
make up the core of our lives are complex and multidimensional, 
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rely on complex unstated conventions, and allow extensive room for 
variation and improvisation. One doctorʼs bedside manner is not like 
anotherʼs. But there are things which every doctor should do, one 
way or another, and others no doctor may do. And so on.
Freedom depends on options that depend on rules that constitute 
those options. The next stage in the argument shows that options pre-
suppose a culture. They presuppose shared meanings and common 
practices. Why so? – the child may ask – why must I play chess as it 
is known to our culture, rather than invent my own game? Indeed, 
the wise parent will answer, there is nothing to stop you from invent-
ing your own game. But this is only possible because inventing oneʼs 
own games is an activity recognized by our culture with its own form 
and meaning. What you cannot do is invent everything in your life. 
Why not? the child will persist, as children do. The answer is essen-
tially that we cannot be children all the time. It is impossible to con-
duct oneʼs life on the basis of explicit and articulated rules. The den-
sity of our activities, their multiplicity of dimensions make it impos-
sible to consider and decide deliberately on all of them. A lot has to 
be done, so to speak, automatically. But to fi t into a pattern that auto-
matic aspect of behavior has to be guided, to be directed and chan-
neled into a coherent meaningful whole. Here then is the argument.
The core options that give meaning to our lives – the different oc-
cupations we can pursue, the friendships and relationships we can 
have, the loyalties and commitments that we attract and develop, the 
cultural, sporting, or other interests we develop – are all dense webs 
of complex actions and interactions. They are open only to those who 
master them, but their complexity and the density of their details de-
fy explicit learning or comprehensive articulation. They are available 
only to those who have or can acquire practical knowledge of them, 
that is, knowledge embodied in social practices and transmitted by 
habituation.
So far I have been talking of social practices that constitute
options as if they come one by one. The reality is different. Social prac-
tices are interlaced with each other. The practices of parenting inter-
sect with those of other social relationships. Not only do many people 
move naturally from one role to another, but even where such transi-
tions are not expected the different family roles are, at least, in part 
defi ned by analogy and contrast to each other. Similarly with occupa-
tions. Our common ways of distinguishing groups of them, such as 
the professions, clerical jobs, those belonging to trade and commerce, 
the caring professions, and so on, are each marked by common and 
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overlapping practices. This commonality of interlocking, practices 
making up the range of life options open to anyone socialized into 
them is what cultures are. Small wonder, then, that membership in 
cultural groups is of vital importance to individuals.
Only through being socialized in a culture can one tap the options 
that give life a meaning. By and large, oneʼs cultural membership 
determines the horizon of oneʼs opportunities, of what one may be-
come, or (if one is older) what one might have been. Little surprise 
that it is in the interest of every person to be fully integrated in a 
cultural group. Equally plain is the importance to its members of the 
prosperity, cultural and material, of that group. Its prosperity contri-
butes to the richness and variety of the opportunities they have access 
to. This is the fi rst of three ways in which membership in a cultural 
group affects oneʼs prospects in life.
The second is the fact that a common culture facilitates social
relations and is a condition of rich and comprehensive personal rela-
tionships2. One particular relationship is especially sensitive to this 
point. Erotic attraction, economic, or certain raw emotional needs 
can often help overcome even the greatest cultural gaps. But in oneʼs 
relations with oneʼs children and with oneʼs parents, a common cul-
ture is an essential condition for the tight bonding we expect and 
desire. A policy that forcibly detaches children from the culture of 
their parents not only undermines the stability of society by under-
mining peopleʼs ability to sustain long-term intimate relations, it also 
threatens one of the deepest desires of most parents, the desire to 
understand their children, share their world, and to remain close to 
them.
Finally, being a member of a prosperous cultural community
affects individual wellbeing because, for most people, membership is a 
major determinant of their sense of who they are; it contributes to 
what we have come to call their sense of identity. This is not really 
surprising given that oneʼs culture sets the horizon of oneʼs opportu-
nities. I am what I am, but equally I am what I can become or could 
have been. To understand a person we need to know how that person 
came to be what he or she is, that is, to understand what she might 
have been and why she is some of those things and not others. In this 
way culture constitutes identity. Slighting my culture, holding it up 
for ridicule, denying its value, and so on, hurts me and offends my 
2  This point does not suggest that people belonging to two nations, or two social classes, say 
a French or a Dutch person, cannot be friends. What I am suggesting is that there is a considerable 
common cultural background to people from diverse but culturally neighboring groups.
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dignity. It is particularly offensive if the slight bears the imprimatur 
of my state or of the majority or offi cial culture of my country.
So this is the case for multiculturalism. It is a case that recognizes 
that cultural groups are not susceptible to reductive analysis in terms 
of individual actions or states of mind. Cultural, and other, groups 
have a life of their own. But their moral claim to respect and to pros-
perity rests entirely on their importance to the prosperity of individu-
al human beings. This case is a liberal case for it emphasizes culture 
as a factor that gives shape and content to individual freedom. Be-
cause individual freedom and well-being depend on unimpeded mem-
bership in a respected and prosperous cultural group, there is little 
wonder that multiculturalism emerges as a central element in any de-
cent liberal political program for societies inhabited by a number of 
viable cultural groups.
2. The Dialectics of Pluralism
One of the diffi culties in making multiculturalism politically ac-
ceptable stems from the enmity between members of different cul-
tural groups, especially when they inhabit one and the same country. 
Such enmity is quite universal. Even when relations between two 
communities are at their most amicable, they are accompanied by 
disapproval of the other culture for its decadence or vulgarity, for 
lack of a sense of humor, for its treatment of women, or something 
else. It would be comforting to think that such enmity is sometimes 
justifi ed, and in the other cases it is due to ignorance and bigotry that 
can be eradicated. I believe, however, that this optimism is unwar-
ranted, and that confl ict is endemic to multiculturalism.
It is, in fact, endemic to value pluralism in all its forms. Value 
pluralism is the view that many different activities and incompatible 
forms of life are valuable. Two values are incompatible if they cannot 
be realized or pursued to the fullest degree in a single life. In this 
sense value pluralism is a familiar mundane phenomenon. One can-
not be both a sprinter and a long-distance runner, far they require the 
development of different physical abilities and also tend to suit dif-
ferent psychological types. Philosophers do not make good generals, 
and generals do not make good philosophers. One cannot pursue both 
the contemplative and the active life, and so on.
The mutual exclusivity of valuable activities and ways of life is a 
commonplace. It becomes philosophically signifi cant the moment 
one rejects the belief in the reducibility of all values to one value that 
serves as a common denominator to all the valuable ways of life. In 
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our day and age, the reduction is most commonly to the value of feel-
ing happy, or having oneʼs desires satisfi ed. Value pluralism is the 
doctrine that denies that such a reduction is possible. It takes the plu-
rality of valuable activities and ways of life to be ultimate and ine-
liminable. This radically changes our understanding of pluralism. On 
a reductive-monistic view, when one trades the pleasures (and anxie-
ties) of family life for a career as a sailor one is hoping to get the 
same thing one is giving up, be it happiness, pleasure, or something 
else. So long as one plans correctly and succeeds in carrying out 
oneʼs plans, there is no loss of any kind. One gives up the lesser 
pleasure one would derive from a family for the greater pleasure of 
life at sea. If value pluralism is correct, this view is totally wrong. 
What one loses is of a different kind from what one gains. Even in 
success there is a loss, and quite commonly there is no meaning to 
the judgment that one gains more than one loses. When one was 
faced with valuable options and successfully chose one of them, then 
one simply chose one way of life rather than another, both being 
good and not susceptible to comparison of degree.
Theoretically, this plurality of valuable ways of life need not mani-
fest itself in the same society. We may value the culture of the classi-
cal Greeks without its opportunities being options for us. But typi-
cally in our day and age, pluralism exists within every society, indeed, 
within every culture. That generates confl ict among incompatible ac-
tivities and ways of life. When valuable alternatives are remote and 
unavailable, they do not threaten our commitment to and confi dence 
in the values manifested in our own life. But when they are available 
to us and pursued by others in our vicinity, they tend to be felt as a 
threat. I chose A over B, but was I right? Skills and character traits 
cherished by my way of life are a handicap for those pursuing one or 
another of its alternatives. I value long contemplation and patient ex-
amination: these are the qualities I require in my chosen course. Their 
life, by contrast, requires impetuosity, swift responses, and decisive 
action, and they despise the slow contemplative types as indecisive. 
They almost have to. To succeed in their chosen way, they have to be 
committed to it and to believe that the virtues it requires should be 
cultivated. They therefore cannot regard those others as virtues for 
them. By the same token it is only natural that they will value in oth-
ers what they choose to emulate themselves. Hence, we have a variety 
of dismissive attitudes to the virtues of the competing ways of life.
Confl ict is endemic. Of course, pluralists can step back from their 
personal commitments and appreciate in the abstract the value of oth-
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er ways of life. But this acknowledgment coexists with, and cannot 
replace, the feelings of rejection and dismissiveness. Tension is an 
inevitable concomitant of value pluralism. And it is a tension without 
stability, without the prospect of a reconciliation of the two perspec-
tives, the one. recognizing the validity of competing values and the 
one hostile to them. One is forever moving from one to the other.
3. The Transforming Effect
The inescapable tension between acceptance of and rivalry with 
competing valuable ways of life, which forever threatens to destabi-
lize it, is common to all forms of value pluralism, where incompatible 
options coexist in the same society. This tension exists in homogene-
ous as well as in multicultural societies. Admittedly the latter tend to 
generate a heightened awareness of the tension because they polarize 
it along cultural-ethnic divides. But it is equally acute in societies 
with strong class divisions, for example. The next form of the dialec-
tics of pluralism I want to focus on is specifi c to multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism arises from a break in a relatively homogeneous 
society. It is a result of the conquest of a territory and the subjugation 
of its indigenous population, or of large-scale migrations such as the 
migration of East African Indians to Britain or Turks to the Nether-
lands. Sometimes it arises as a consequence of political union of peo-
ple from neighboring, but culturally distinct, countries. In all these 
cases the constituent cultures face great pressures to change as a re-
sult of their interaction with the other groups. Naturally, they wish to 
resist the pressure. The desire to resist is particularly felt by small 
communities facing the challenge of coexistence with much larger 
groups whose cultures dominate the public arena.
The view that I advocate may be expected to be sympathetic to 
such conservationist trends. After all, the whole idea of multicultural-
ism is to encourage communities to sustain their own diverse cul-
tures. But although this is so, and although it is of the essence of 
multiculturalism that different communities should enjoy their fair 
share of opportunities and resources to maintain and develop their 
cultures in their own way, multiculturalism, as I see it, is not inher-
ently opposed to change, not even to change induced by coexistence 
with other cultural groups. On the contrary, multiculturalism insists 
that members of the different groups should appreciate and respect 
the other cultures in their society. This in itself leads to inevitable 
developments in the constituent cultures, especially those that devel-
oped in relative isolation.
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Furthermore, multiculturalism calls on all the constituent commu-
nities in a society to tolerate each other. Some of these communities 
have cultures that are themselves intolerant. Such cultures will face 
great pressure for change in a multicultural society.
Finally, multiculturalism insists on a right of exit, the right of in-
dividuals to abandon their cultural group. Many cultures do all they 
can to stop their members from drifting away. On this front, again, 
they will fi nd themselves under pressure to change in a liberal multi-
cultural society3.
This tension in multiculturalism between a policy of protecting a 
plurality of cultures and encouraging change in them may surprise 
some. But it should not. Liberal multiculturalism does not arise out 
of conservative nostalgia for pure exotic cultures. It is not a policy of 
conserving or fossilizing cultures in their pristine state. Nor is it a 
policy fostering variety for its own sake. It recognizes that change is 
inevitable in todayʼs world. It recognizes that fossilized cultures can-
not serve their members well in contemporary societies with their 
fast rate of social and economic change. Liberal multiculturalism 
stems from a concern for the well-being of the members of society. 
That well-being presupposes respect for oneʼs cultural group and its 
prosperity. But none of this is opposed to change.
Change is resisted most when it comes as a result of the hostility 
of the dominant culture. It is also resisted when it arouses fear that 
oneʼs culture will disappear altogether – diluted and then assimilated 
by others. In a country where multiculturalism is practiced by the 
government and accepted by the population the fi rst fear should not 
arise. The second is less easily laid to rest. Nor is liberal multicultur-
alism opposed in principle to the assimilation of one cultural group 
by others. In some countries some of the constituent cultures may 
lose their vitality and be gradually absorbed. So long as the process 
is not coerced, does not arise out of lack of respect for people and 
their communities, and is suffi ciently gradual, there is nothing wrong 
in it. The dying of old cultures is as much part of normal life as the 
birth of new ones. But the process is much slower and rarer than 
those who trumpet their fears of the death of their cultures suggest. 
What they commonly intend is resistance to change, masquerading, 
innocently or otherwise, as a fi ght for survival.
3  It is important to recall that this discussion is confi ned to multicultural societies where the 
different communities are not geographically segregated.
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In these last remarks, I display again the non-utopian character of 
the liberal multiculturalism that I advocate. It rejects any ideal that 
commits us to arrest the course of time, the pressures for change, at 
some moment of perfection. Indeed, it refuses to have any truck with 
notions of perfection. Furthermore, it is non-utopian in seeing, con-
fl ict between and within cultures as endemic.
4. Why respect Cultures?
The earlier discussion has already brought into the open the most 
fundamental dialectical element in liberal multiculturalism. While it 
respects a variety of cultures it refuses to take them at their own es-
timation. It has its own reasons for respecting cultures, reasons like 
those expressed in the fi rst part of this essay. These are likely to vary 
from the reasons provided in most cultures for their value. For exam-
ple, religious cultures will justify themselves in theological terms. 
The justifi cation of those very same cultures in the eyes of liberal 
multiculturalism is humanistic, not theological. In particular, multi-
culturalism urges respect for cultures that are not themselves liberal 
cultures – very few are. But it does so while imposing liberal protec-
tions for individual freedom on those cultures. This in itself brings it 
into confl ict with the cultures it urges governments to respect. The 
confl ict is inevitable because liberal multiculturalism recognizes and 
respects those cultures only to the extent that they serve true values. 
Since its respect of cultures is conditional and granted from a point 
of view outside many of them, it fi nds itself in uneasy alliance with 
supporters of those cultures, sometimes joining them in a common 
front while at other times turning against them to impose ideals of 
toleration and mutual respect or to protect the members of those very 
cultures against oppression by their own group.
5. Objections to Multiculturalism
It is time to turn to the objections to multiculturalism. The one I 
can do least justice to is that which says: «Some cultures are inferior 
to others. By encouraging their prosperity, one is acting against the 
interests of their members. To serve their interests best one should 
discourage those cultures and encourage rapid assimilation of their 
members into our superior culture». I believe that very often judg-
ments about the inferiority of other cultures are based on bigotry and 
ignorance, and that in truth many cultures cannot be compared in 
those terms. Each of them is valuable. Each of them can be improved 
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in a way consistent with its own spirit and out of its own resources. 
But none of them can be judged superior to the others. However, 
these views can only be justifi ed by plunging into a discussion of the 
foundations of ethics, which we are mercifully absolved from here. 
Instead I will address three subsidiary points.
First, some people fear, consciously or unconsciously, that if our 
culture is not superior to others, we are not entitled to love it as much 
as we do. If it is not the best, they feel, then it is irrational to be so 
dedicated to its preservation and cultivation. Moreover, if it is not the 
best then our ignorance of other cultures is inexcusable. If they are 
all good and none is superior, we should be equally knowledgeable 
and interested in all of them.
It is not my wish to discourage people from taking an interest in 
other cultures, and one should certainly be acquainted with the cultures 
that inhabit one s̓ country – this is so whether or not they are the equal 
of one s̓ own. That is one of the duties of citizenship and has nothing 
to do with the merits of any culture. Putting these considerations aside 
for the moment, let it be said that one s̓ devotion to and love of one s̓ 
culture in no way depends on believing it to be better than others. It is 
rational and valid whether or not it is better than others, so long as one 
loves one s̓ own culture for what is truly good in it.
Compare one s̓ attitude to one s̓ culture with one s̓ love of one s̓ 
children. We rightly ridicule parents who feel that their devotion to 
their children requires holding them to be little geniuses, much better 
than other children. One loves one s̓ children because they are one s̓ 
children4. The same is true with all personal attachments. The people 
one loves need not be better than others to make one s̓ love rational. So 
long as one loves them for the right reasons, and admires in them their 
virtues rather than their vices, one s̓ love and friendship are sound.
Nor need one feel obliged to become acquainted with all valuable 
cultures. To do so is the desire of some people, and it is a worthy 
desire. But it is not one that all people must share. There is no reason 
to know about or share in everything that is valuable. This too is an 
aspect of value pluralism. There are many valuable things in the 
world, and we have no reason to, nor any real possibility of, pursuing 
all of them.
Second, I would not wish to deny that some cultures or aspects of 
some cultures are unacceptable and should not benefi t from the posi-
4  And I do not mean genetically oneʼs own. I mean that they are children one brought up and 
is attached to.
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tive attitude that multiculturalism stands for. Some cultures, for ex-
ample, repress groups of their own members or of outsiders. Slave 
cultures, racially discriminatory cultures, and homophobic cultures, 
are obvious examples. These can be supported only to the degree that 
it is possible to neutralize their oppressive aspects, or compensate for 
them (for example by providing a convenient exit to members of the 
group discriminated against).
The test of oppression should be carefully considered. One needs 
to distinguish between it and the occasional failure of socialization 
that leaves an individual member of a cultural group alienated from 
the culture and unable to fi nd fulfi llment within it. Occasional fail-
ures of socialization are endemic to all cultures. Oppression differs 
from them in being the result of a structural feature of a culture that 
systematically prevents people from giving expression to an impor-
tant aspect of their nature. Not all people will be affected, many will 
not belong to the oppressed group, where the oppression is based on 
racial, religious, or some such grounds. Others will not have a great 
need to express the repressed aspect of their personality, or they will 
fi nd ways of making do with alternatives. In all sexually oppressive 
societies many people learn to do without much sex. In societies that 
repress free inquiry or creativity, many fi nd that their need to engage 
in these is limited. Adjustability is never complete, and repression 
invariably leads to much suffering. Even those who adjust suffer. 
Their lives and personalities become stunted and do not reach full 
expression. When this is a result of a systematic feature of their cul-
ture, the fault is with the culture. In serious cases; it may justify sup-
pressing oppressive cultures. In others, it will call for reform and for 
mitigating actions in the larger, multicultural society.
Third, even when cultures are at fault, we have reason for support-
ive toleration. People bred and socialized within such cultures often 
know no better, and have no choice. Moreover, by the time they are 
grown up their ability to transplant themselves and become a part of 
another culture is limited. The limits differ from case to case and are 
a matter of degree. It is easier to acquire a home in a new cultural 
community when it does not differ too much from oneʼs own and 
when one has self-generated motives to do so. It is more diffi cult 
when the distance between the cultures is great and the reason for the 
transition is externally imposed. Given that even oppressive cultures 
can give people quite a lot, it follows that one should be particularly 
wary of organized campaigns of assimilation and discrimination 
against “inferior” and oppressive cultures. They provide many of 
their members with all that they can have.
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In saying this I am not retreating from my earlier view that oppres-
sion should not be tolerated. I am merely urging restraint and consid-
eration in thinking of the means by which it is to be countered.
Oppression of members of the cultural group was the second ob-
jection to multiculturalism introduced at the outset. We have already 
considered it, and conceded its force. It is worth adding here that 
existence in a multicultural society often makes cultural groups more 
repressive than they would be were they to exist in relative isolation. 
The insecurity of existence, especially where there is real or per-
ceived discrimination, tends to encourage conservative elements in 
cultural groups. It also tends to increase pressure on members of the 
group to turn inward and reduce their contact with the external world 
– as the only guarantee against defection from the group. Such con-
servative and repressive pressures can lead to bitter intergenerational 
confl icts.
Furthermore, the signifi cance of various social practices may 
change in the new context of a multicultural society. The status of 
women is a case in point. Probably all cultures known to us, even 
those that did not repress women, distinguished between men and 
women – in that a large array of social relationships, occupations, 
leisure activities, and educational and cultural opportunities, were 
gender specifi c. If such separation does not carry with it the implica-
tion of an inferior status, and if the opportunities available to both 
men and women are adequate for their full development and self-ex-
pression, there is nothing wrong with such gender-sensitive cultures 
– so long as they succeed in socializing the young to a willing accept-
ance of their ways. But once such a cultural group is transplanted to a 
different environment in which the dominant cultures accept gender 
determination of opportunities only in exceptional cases, the trans-
planted group is transformed into an oppressive one. In the new envi-
ronment it is bound to fail in socializing its young to accept its ways 
and reject the ideas prevalent in the general culture. In contemporary 
liberal societies, the prevailing notions of gender nondiscrimination 
and the debate about feminism are bound to fi lter across cultural bar-
riers. They will affect the self-understanding of the young (and not 
only the young). They will inform their perceptions of their own na-
tive cultural practices. When this happens the meaning of the gender-
based practices changes. It is understood by many of its own members 
as consigning women to an inferior status. Protestations that that is a 
perversion of the true meaning of those practices are to no avail. The 
true meaning of social practices is their social meaning.
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A positive attitude to multiculturalism can be thought to lend sup-
port to the conservative strands in various communities. But to my 
mind this is a mistake. Cultures are bound to undergo changes within 
a multicultural society. The fact that members of cultural groups in-
termix to a considerable degree is bound to have its impact on the 
different groups in the society. The preservation of their culture is 
justifi ed only in terms of its contribution to well-being. This requires 
an adjustment of each, of the groups to the conditions of a relatively 
harmonious coexistence within one political society.
Peaceful coexistence in one political society requires men and 
women to acquaint themselves with the customs of all the people and 
ethnic groups in their country. Hence they will have opportunities, 
sometimes temptations, to drift out of their native cultural group into 
another. Attempts to prevent people from seizing these opportunities 
undermine the possibility of mutual peaceful existence.
Moreover, the opportunity to exit from a group is a vital protection 
for those members of it who are oppressed by its culture. The oppor-
tunity of exit is a counter to the worry that multiculturalism encour-
ages oppressive cultures to perpetuate their ways. I have already indi-
cated that political societies are entitled, indeed required to discourage 
oppressive practices in their constituent cultural groups. The groups 
should be encouraged to change such practices. But this is a very slow 
process. Opportunities of exit should be encouraged as a safeguard, 
however imperfect, for members who cannot develop and fi nd ade-
quate avenues for self-expression within their native culture.
6. Solidarity
The fi nal objection to multiculturalism is that it undermines social 
solidarity, which is invariably built on the possession of a common 
culture. Without a deep feeling of solidarity, a political society will 
disintegrate into quarreling factions. Solidarity is required if people 
are to feel concerned about each otherʼs fortunes, and to be willing to 
make sacrifi ces for other people. Without such willingness the pos-
sibility of a peaceful political society disappears.
There is a lot of truth in this argument. Civic solidarity is essential 
to the existence of a well-ordered political society. But the argument 
is too quick in asserting that a common culture is essential to solidar-
ity, and that multiculturalism is inconsistent with the existence of a 
common culture.
Let me take the last point fi rst. The truth is that multiculturalism, 
while endorsing the perpetuation of several cultural groups in a sin-
46 Joseph Raz
gle political society, also requires the existence of a common culture. 
First, coexistence calls for the cultivation of mutual toleration and 
respect. This affects the education of the young in all the constituent 
groups in the society. All of them will enjoy education in the cultural 
traditions of their own communities, but all of them will also be edu-
cated to understand and respect the traditions of the other groups in 
the society. This will apply to the majority group, where such a group 
exists, as well. Its young will learn the minority traditions of their 
society. Cultivation of mutual respect and tolerance, knowledge of 
the history and traditions of oneʼs country with all its communities, 
will provide one element of a common culture.
A second element will result from the fact that members of all 
communities will interact in the same economic environment. They 
will share in tapping the same job market, the same market for serv-
ices and for goods. This means that they will have to possess the 
same mathematical, literary, and other skills required for effective 
participation in the economy.
Finally, members of all cultural groups will belong to the same 
political society. They will enjoy roughly equal access to the sources 
of political power and to decision-making positions. They will have 
to acquire a common political language and conventions of conduct 
to be able to participate effectively in the competition for resources 
and the protection of group as well as individual interests in a shared 
political arena.
The emergence of such a common culture is still an aspiration, for 
while elements of it are already evident in some multicultural societies, 
none has reached the level of development of a common culture, that is 
evident in some culturally homogeneous societies. Whether the sort of 
common culture I have outlined is capable of forming a basis for social 
solidarity suffi cient to secure the cohesion and stability of modern
political, societies remains a moot point. But I think that it may serve 
this purpose successfully, and should be given a chance to do so.
But, while the liberal common culture of pluralistic societies re-
mains to be developed, a swift social change toward multiculturalism 
may severely test the existing bonds of solidarity in a society and 
threaten disintegration or a backlash of rabid nationalism: this, while 
it does not pose an objection of principle to liberal multiculturalism, 
requires great caution in the method and speed with which multicul-
tural policies are implemented.
Multiculturalism, in the sense of the existence within the same 
political society of a number of sizable cultural groups wishing and 
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able to maintain their distinct identity, is with us to stay. It is likely to 
grow in size and importance. Liberal multiculturalism, as I call it, 
affi rms that in the circumstances of contemporary industrial or postin-
dustrial societies, a political attitude of fostering and encouraging the 
prosperity, cultural and material, of cultural groups within a society, 
and respecting their identity is justifi ed by considerations of freedom 
and human dignity. These considerations call on governments to take 
action that goes beyond that required by policies of toleration and 
nondiscrimination. While incorporating policies of nondiscrimina-
tion, liberal multiculturalism transcends the individualistic approach 
and recognizes the importance of unimpeded membership in a
respected and fl ourishing cultural group for individual well-being.
This doctrine has far-reaching ramifi cations. It calls on us to recon-
ceive society, changing its self-image. We should learn to think of 
our societies as consisting not of a majority and minorities, but of a 
plurality of cultural groups. Naturally, such developments take a long 
period to come to fruition, and they cannot be secured through gov-
ernment action alone, as they require a widespread change in attitude. 
The current attitude of the population at large, and the speed with 
which it accepts the precepts of multiculturalism, set limits on the 
practicability and good sense of proceeding with various concrete 
policies to advance and implement liberal multiculturalism. But we 
must think of the long term to set short-term policies within a sensi-
ble context. The size of cultural groups and their viability also affect 
the way various concrete measures should be pursued. There is no 
point in trying to prop up by public action cultures that have become 
moribund and whose communities – usually their young members – 
drift away from them. Of course multiculturalism changes the pros-
pects of survival for cultures it supports. That is its aim. But it recog-
nizes that public policies can only serve to facilitate developments 
desired by the population, not to force cultural activities down the 
throats of an indifferent population.
The more concrete policies, which become appropriate gradually 
as developments justify them, include measures like the following:
1) The young of all cultural groups should be educated, if their par-
ents so desire, in the culture of their own groups. But all of them 
should also be educated to be familiar with and cultivate an atti-
tude of respect for the history and traditions of all the cultures in 
the country.
2) The customs and practices of the different groups should, within 
the limits of toleration we have explored earlier, be recognized in 
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law and by all public bodies in society, as well as by private com-
panies and organizations that serve the public. At the moment, 
petty intolerance is rife in many countries. In Britain people still 
have to fi ght to be allowed to wear traditional dress to school or to 
work, to give one example.
3) It is crucial to break the link between poverty, under-education, 
and ethnicity. So long as certain ethnic groups are so overwhelm-
ingly over-represented among poor, ill-educated, unskilled, and 
semiskilled workers, the possibilities of cultivating respect for 
their cultural identity, even the possibilities of self-respect, are 
greatly undermined.
4) There should be generous public support for autonomous cultural 
institutions, such as communal charities, voluntary organizations, 
libraries, museums, and artistic groups. In the competition for 
public resources the size of the groups concerned is an important 
factor. It works in two ways. By and large, it favors the larger 
groups with a more committed membership. But it also calls for 
disproportionate support for small groups that are strong enough 
to pass the viability test. Given that the overheads are signifi cant, 
the per capita cost of support for small groups is greater than for 
large ones.
5) Public space (as well as air space on television) should accommo-
date all the cultural groups. Where they differ in their aesthetic 
sense, in their preferences for colors, patterns, smells, music, noise 
and speed, some public spaces may be divided between them, as 
often happens without direction in ethnic neighborhoods, while 
preserving others as common to all.
Of course, all such measures are designed to lead to relatively 
harmonious coexistence of non-oppressive and tolerant communities. 
They, therefore, have their limits. But it is important not to use false 
standards as tests of the limits of toleration. The fact that the Turkish 
government, say, does not tolerate certain practices of the Kurds in 
Turkey, is no reason why Kurds from Turkey should not be allowed 
to resume the practices when they settle in Europe. Similarly, the fact 
that tolerating certain immigrant practices will lead to changes in the 
character of some neighborhoods or public spaces in oneʼs country is 
no reason for suppressing them. Toleration is limited only in denying 
communities the right to repress their own members, in discouraging 
intolerant attitudes to outsiders, in insisting on making exit from the 
community a viable option for its members. Beyond that, liberal mul-
ticulturalism will also require all groups to allow their members
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access to adequate opportunities for self-expression and full partici-
pation in the economic life and the political culture of the commu-
nity.
The combined effect of such policies is that liberal multicultural-
ism leads not to the abandonment of a common culture, but to the 
emergence of a new common culture that is respectful toward all the 
groups of the country, and hospitable to their prosperity.
